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MAKING SEPARATE EQUAL : 
* 
THE INTEGRATION OF BLACK AND WHITE SCHOOL FUNDS IN KENTUCKY , 1882 
J .  Morgan Kousser 
On August 6, 1882 , the Kentucky electorate , 84 percent of which 
was white , approved by a 54 to 46 percent margin a referendum proposal
to increase school property taxes for whites by 10 percent in order to 
triple state-level educational expenditures for black children , thereby 
bringing them up to the same amount as white expenditures. Passage of 
the measure equalizing state spending , which accounted for about 64 
percent o f  the total amount allocated to public primary and secondary 
schools in Kentucky in the 1880s , was , according to state school 
superintendent Joshua Desha Pickett , "the most remarkable fact in the 
school history of Kentucky . 11
1 
Why did this referendum , an event not directly paralleled , so 
far as I know , in any other Southern state , take place? What does the 
passage of the proposal indicate about attitudes toward blacks and black 
educat ion held by various segments of the Kentucky electorate blacks 
themselves , as well as white Republicans and various factions of the 
Democracy? How did the equalization issue fit into the larger , ongoing 
* 
I want to thank my colleague Forrest Nelson for introducing me to logi t ,  
shepherding the computerized analysis , and straightening out my , alas , 
too numerous , confusions. Any remaining errors are my own fault. 
political struggles in Kentucky and the South? By bringing both 
2 
quantitative and impressionistic evidence to bear on these questions , 
I hope in this paper to illuminate at least one important and previously 
almost unno ticed corner of the largely murky political and educational 
history of the border states , as well as to demonstrate the usefulness 
of a statistical technique -- Logit analysis -- which has so far escaped 
the attention of historians.2 
Since they were never subj ected to military Reconstruction and 
escaped having their antebellum constitutions recast by Republican­
dominated constitutional conventions , whites in the border states o f  
Delaware ,  Kentucky , and Maryland were much freer than their ex-
Confederate counterparts to define the legal s tatus of their former 
slaves as they wished. While the reconstructed states were all 
constrained by their 1866-68 constitutions to provide "equal benefits" 
for or "no dis tinctions" between blacks and whites in their segregated 
public schools ,  the Democrats who controlled the three border states 
made only halting , ungenerous gestures toward black education. Maryland 
appropriated separate and unequal funds for black schools from her state 
treasury . Delaware kept the taxes l evied on each race separate , and , 
as the Johnsonian Reconstruction governments in Florida and Texas had 
proposed to do , s tarved black schools by allocating to them only the 
3 funds collected from Negroes. 
Kentucky was even less liberal . Pressured by the Freedmen's 
Bureau , the state in 1866 dedicated half of the poll and property taxes 
paid by b lacks to black school s , which raised about 13.5 cents per black 
child from 6 to 20 years of age . White expenditures per child were about 
3 
six times as high . In 186 8 ,  however , the legislature , dominated by a 
"Bourbon" faction which openly "scoffed at education for Negroes , "  
declared that all money from black taxes was t o  g o  for the support o f  
Negro paupers. There were apparently no state-supported black schools 
in Kentucky from 1868 until 1874,  when the legislature , anticipating 
Congressional passage of a bill allocating funds from public lands to 
those states which provided a free education to all children between 
6 and 1 6 ,  revived the separate-tax-and-allocation system for black 
education . 4 The s tate bill , which most Republicans in the legislature
opposed as unfair to blacks , provided that all state property and license 
taxes paid by Negroes (as opposed to about 44 percent of those on whites) 
would go to black educat ion . Because the tax on black property would 
yield such a small sum, the legislature additionally authorized a one 
dollar poll tax on black , but no t white , male adults. Though no funds 
from white taxes would be spent for black education , the legislature did 
hold out the promise that some of the expected federal aid might be 
used to upgrade black schools. Since the federal largesse never 
materialized,  however , the system remained racially inequitable both in 
taxation and expenditures. In 187 6 ,  for example ,  the state allocated 
$1 . 90 for each white child between the ages of 6 and 2 0 ,  but only 30 
cents for each black child between 6 and 1 6 ,  or nearly nine times as 
much for whites as blacks if the age bases o f  the two groups had been 
equalized.
5 
Blacks and their white Republican allies denounced the system 
immediately and vociferously . Black leaders , who had been demanding 
equal taxation and equal education in conventions since at least 1 86 9 ,  
4 
held a statewide convention in Lexington in 1875 to organize a petition 
drive to convince the legislature to merge the two funds and equalize 
taxes . 6 Since they contributed at leas t a third , and probably a much
larger percentage , of the Republican vo tes in the state,  the Negroes 
easily pressured the 1875 GOP state convention to commit itself to equal 
funding. "As a matter of j ustice , no less than of wise statesmanship , "  
the party's platform declared in its f irst plank on state issues , "we 
hold that the provision now made for the education o f  colored children 
should be increased until they are afforded , in their separate schools ,  
facilities o f  obtaining ins truction in every respect equal t o  those 
provided for white education . "  Although faced with a campaign which 
centered , as all Kentucky campaigns s ince 1865 had , on racial issues , 
Republican gubernatorial nominee John Marshall Harlan reiterated this 
plank in speeches from one end of the s tate to the o ther . 7 While the
Democratic platform was silent on this , as on all o ther state issues , 
the party's candidate for governor ,  James B .  McCreary , denounced the 
Republican proposal; the Democratic state superintendent of schools 
dismissed black pro tests as a mere reflection of a "captious disposi-
tion to find fault with everything that is done for them"; and the 
state's leading "New Departure" Democratic organ urged blacks to show 
their thanks for finally receiving at leas t some school money by vo ting 
Democratic; o therwise , the paternalistic and comparatively moderate 
Courier-Journal counseled , the Negroes would prove themselves "a race 
of pig-headed irreconcilables . 11
8 
Petitions , speeches , and conventions having left the 1874 
law unscathed , the blacks turned to the courts . 9 On November 25 , 1881 , 
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a white Paducah attorney , E .  W .  Bagby , who was chairman of the county 
GOP committee and a member of the party's s tate committee , argued the 
case of Kentucky v. Jesse Ellis in the federal circuit cour t . 10
Unreported by the West Publishing Co . and consequently virtually unknown 
heretofore , the case was apparently organized and financed by the very 
active black community in McCracken county , and was to have profound 
consequences for the s tate's educational system. 11 In his argument
before federal j udges John W .  Barr and John Baxter , Bagby challenged the 
s tate's right to collect a poll tax for support of Negro s chools from 
Ellis , a black man , when it did not impose such a tax on whites . This , 
Bagby claimed , was s tate action in violation of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment .  More broadly , Bagby averred that 
the entire system of Kentucky schools supported by racially separate 
taxes was contrary to the equal pro tection clause ,  and the more express 
provisions of the federal civil rights act ,  and was therefore wholly 
uncons titutiona1 . 12 Asserting that his client in this test case could
not expect , according to a previous decision in the highest s tate cour t ,  
t o  receive j ustice , Bagby asked the federal court t o  take j urisdiction 
of the matter . 1 3
While the Ellis case was pending in federal cour t ,  Republicans 
in the 1881-82 session of the state legislature decided to force the 
issue more directly . On January 7 ,  1 882 , thirty-year-old Hopkinsville 
attorney and Republican House leader James Breathitt introduced a bill 
to merge the two school funds , and to equalize the taxes , school terms , 
and eligible age-groups of whites and blacks immediately , and to submit 
the question of raising s chool property taxes by ten mills , which would 
6 
have amounted to a 50 percent rise for whites , to a referendum at the 
time of the Augus t  1 882 state elections . Son of a Union army veteran 
who had been a locally prominent Republican since the War , Breathitt 
was a fluent speaker who represented a county with the second highest 
proportion of Negroes (46 . 2  percent in 1880) in the s tate . His staunch 
defense of Negroes' rights to serve on j uries and receive equal , though 
separate educational opportunities and his attacks on such racist 
measures as an at temp t to rees tablish the whipping post as a penalty 
for petty theft , an o ffense for which whites were seldom convicted , no 
doubt rather closely represented the views of his county's largely black 
Republican electorate.14
Democrats from similar constituencies sometimes shared the 
Republicans' views on these issues . On February 7 ,  1882 , James H .  
Mulligan o f  Fayette County , which was 44 . 7  percent Negro , the fourth 
highest percentage in the state , sought to amend a bill merging the 
school funds of Greenup County to apply it to the whole state , and on 
February 11 , he introduced a more comprehensive equalization bill . The 
fact that nearly all the county's Negroes , according to the s tate's 
leading Republican newspaper , had backed Mulligan's Republican opponent 
in the last election seems to have convinced Mulligan to try to expand 
his base of support , rather than to seek revenge . 
Moreover , the counties represented by Breathitt and Mulligan 
shared another trait which made equalization of s tate funds attractive . 
Both were comparatively wealthy Fayette had the fifth highest level 
of white property values per white male adult of the state's 117 
counties in 1 882 -- and both had high proportions o f  blacks . Under the 
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laws then in force , both counties sent a relatively large amount of 
school tax money to Frankfort , but , because the state funds were 
dis tributed on a per capita basis which discriminated against blacks , 
received much less from the state than they would under a formula which 
counted each child equally , regardless of race .  Thus , not only the 
black , but also the white constituents of Mulligan and Breathitt s tood 
to gain from state equalization because the change would substantially 
increase the flow of funds available for consumers to spend in their 
counties, 15
As the legislative session dragged on ( the Kentucky legislature , 
unlike those in most Southern states during this period , operated under 
no constitutional time constraint , but ,  like many of them , concerned 
itself primarily with huge numbers of local bills ) , it appeared that the 
Breathit t  bill might be buried in the education committee , or , after it 
emerged with no committee recommendation , might be continually postponed .
16
The crucial roll call came on April 10 , when by a 37-29 margin , the House 
voted to postpone the measure until after the legislature's scheduled 
adj ournment date . The Republican Louisville Commercial exploded in 
wrath : 
The conspiracy at Frankfort to defy the Constitution of the 
United States and precipitate a civil war has not yet been 
destroyed . Thanks to the density and extent of Bourbon 
ignorance and its perpetuation in the Legislature , Kentucky 
is the only S tate in the Union which has not accepted the 
war amendments to the Federal constitution, . . .  When these 
antediluvian unteachables placed themselves at Frankfort in 
the attitude of implacable hostility to the great cause o f  
equal education , and with barbaric obtuseness refused to 
recognize the harmonizing and liberalizing and elevating 
influences of the age which give glory to our common country , 
they commit ted the one signal [sic?) crime that was needed 
to kill and damn them politically . 17
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The legislature's "criminal blunder , "  the Commercial stated , would insure 
a gain of "ten thousand votes" for former Lt . Governor Richard T .  Jacob , 
the anti-Bourbon independent candidate for the exceptionally lucrative 
office of Clerk of the Court of Appeals , which was the only statewide 
race in Kentucky in 1 882 . As the chief backer of the independent move-
men t ,  the Commercial sought to duplicate the success of William Mahone's 
Virginia Readj usters , break the Democratic monopoly on state o ffices in 
. . 18 Kentucky , and usher in a genuinely competitive two-party system. 
But the Commercial underrated the Democracy's talent for 
survival , j ust as the Democrats had forgotten the blacks' ability to 
gain in court what they could no t otherwise win in the legislature. 
For on the same day that it noted the pos tponement of the Breathitt bill 
in Frankfor t ,  the Commercial reported Judge Baxter's decision in favor 
of Jesse Ellis in Paducah . Although he ruled that the whole Kentucky 
public educational sys tem was , in effect , unconstitutional , Baxter 
apparently ordered no immediate remedy . His opinion , however , referred 
to his court's earlier decision in the 1882 Ohio case of U . S .  v. Buntin , 
in which the parent of a black child had sought entrance into a white 
school . 1Vhile ruling Ohio school segregation cons titutional , the 
federal circuit j udge in Buntin had charged the j ury to decide whether 
the segregated schools were "equal in the benefits provided . • . " 
9 
Otherwise , the j udge would have to order the Ohio schools integrated. 
In the Ellis case , Baxter ruled that " . . •  any fund created by the 
state for educational purposes must be equally and uniformly distributed 
among both classes , and neither in the raising of the fund by taxation , 
nor in the distribution of it , must there be any inequality or any 
discrimination on account of race or color . 111 9
The decisions in Ellis and Buntin and the threat , repeatedly 
expressed in the newspapers by attorney Bagby and openly resolved by a 
j oyous and determined mass meeting of Paducah blacks , to go back to 
court to seek an appropriate remedy , presented the Democrats in the 
legislature with three al ternatives : equalize,  integrate , or close the 
schools . 20 Since neither of the latter two courses of action promised
to be very popular with the voters , the Democratic leaders had lit tle 
choice but to frame an equalization bill o f  their own . The real question 
after the announcement of the Ellis decision , then , was not whether there 
would be an equalization bill , but what its provisions would be . 
While some Democrats and all but one Republican favored a 
simple bill equalizing the funds per child and raising the school property 
tax rate sufficiently to prevent a decline in the current level of white 
expenditures , many Democratic members still opposed any white support 
for black schools . To prevent a serious Democratic split , House Speaker 
William C .  Owens and his chief lieutenant Clarence U. HcElroy proposed 
a clever compromise .  Their bill equalized the funds and raised taxes , 
but would go into effect only if a maj ority of the voters approved at 
the August election . So-called "young Democrats" could therefore appeal 
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to blacks and nonracist whites by pointing to their votes for equali-
zation; "Bourbons "  could satisfy themselves that the voters would 
disapprove the measure; all could shift the burden of raising taxes to 
their constituents; and if the measure failed and closure , integration , 
or chaos followed , why then , it would be the voters , and not the legis-
lators , who would be to blame . 
At a Democratic caucus on April 2 0 ,  mos t  opponents of equali-
zation walked out before a vo te could be taken . Of the 109 Democrats 
in the House and Senate , only fifty were present when the caucus voted 
26  to 24 against Mulligan's bill raising white taxes and equalizing the 
funds without a referendum . After ·proponents of that measure left , the 
rump of the caucus endorsed the }lcElroy-Owens bill , but opinions differed 
as to whether this nonbinding caucus action -- a maj ority had to be 
present to render an endorsement binding -- would be followed by the 
. ' f h D 
Zl
maJority o t e emocrats . 
The next day , the House considered the NcElroy-Owens bill and 
several amendments . It defeated by 33-51 and 37-48 margins amendments 
by Breathit t  and Mulligan , who sought to equalize the funds without a 
referendum and raise the white tax rate by three mills and two mills ,  
respectively . Then the body voted 48-30 against a compromise by 
Democratic Representative A .  W. Moremen which would have integrated the 
funds at once , but allowed a referendum on a two-and-a-half mill tax 
hike . Finally , the House passed the leadership's measure unamended , 
64-18 . 2 2  The Senate on April 22 voted down an amendment providing for
a two-mil l  increase and immediate equalization by a 16-12 count , and 
then passed the House bill , 2 6-z . 23
11  
I have divided the House members into four groups on  the basis 
of the four April 21 roll calls . Because the eight representatives who 
voted for the Breathitt bil l , but against the McElroy-Owens referendum 
proposal seem to have been outraged at any delay in equalizing the funds 
that they were willing to kill the one measure which had a chance to 
pass , I have denominated them "radicals . "  Next come thirty "liberal" 
House members who favored both McElroy-Owens and at leas t one of the 
substitutes offered by Mulligan , Moremen , and Breathit t .  All but three 
of these men voted for the Breathitt amendment .  Thirty-seven "regular" 
Democrats , one Greenbacker , and one GOP member opposed all the sub­
stitutes , but voted for McElroy-Owens . 2 4  Finally , the eight Democrats
and two Greenbackers who opposed any change , despite the danger that the 
federal court would force integration or suspension of the s chool system, 
were so unwilling to budge that they deserve the "Bourbon" appellation .
25
Party and racial attitude explain many of the legislators' 
votes . Table 1 shows that all but one of the House Republicans fell 
into the liberal or radical categories , while Democrats and Greenbackers 
were much more likely to cluster toward the "Bourbon" end of the scale .
26
If party loyalty and the attitudes which caused them to j o in the GOP 
in the first place account for the Republicans' behavior , what explains 
that of the Democrats? Table 2 cros s-classifies groupings among the 
Democrats on the equalization issue with a February 3 House vo te on the 
bill to reestablish the whipping pos t  for petty theft , a vot e  which 
apparently reflected racial attitudes quite closely . The table shows 
that most of those who favored a return to the antebellum method of 
punishing blacks opposed equalization , and vice-versa.  All but one 
12 
Republican who was recorded on the whipping-pos t  issue opposed its 
reestablishment , while the four Greenbackers split evenly . 
[Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
But if the Democrats' votes on the equalization issue appear 
largely to have reflected the racial beliefs of the legislators an-
their constituencies , what explains variations in those racial attitudes 
across constituencies? One approach to such questions would be to 
subdivide the constituencies into various groups on the basis of their 
s cores on certain socioeconomic or political indices and look at the 
resultant bivariate cross-classification tables . For instance , one 
might separate rural from urban legislators and see whether those from 
each demographic group tended to fall into different attitude groups . 
Then one could repeat the process for other demographic classifications . 
There are three problems with this method. First ,  it makes it difficult 
to discover interactions between two or more independent variables. 
For instance , those legislators who came from heavily-Negro rural areas 
might be more conservative in their racial views than all legislators 
from counties with high percentages of Negroes or all rural salons . 
Second , the analyst o ften knows not only that one county was more urban , 
say ,  than another , but how much more urban it was , but this "interval 
level" information is lost if one simply divides the legislators into 
groups . Third , cross-classification is in effect based on a linear 
model , but the relationships of interest may no t be linear . For instance , 
a Democratic legislator from a wholly white county might be as willing 
to ignore Negro voters as one from a county which was 20 percent black; 
whereas , a representative from a 50 percent Negro county would imperil 
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his career much more by writing off the black vote than one from a 
county in which Negroes made up 30 percent of the electorate .  
These problems can b e  remedied by employing logit analysis , 
one of a group of advanced techniques which have recently been applied 
to the investigation of multivariate contingency tables.2 7  The logit
model is based on the so-called "odds ratio . "  If the odds are six to 
five that a certain horse will win a race , then the probability that 
the touts think he will prevail is six-elevenths , or about 5 4.5 percent . 
The actual logit equation , whose parameters must be estimated by an 
iterative computer algorithm unless all the variables are measured at 
nominal or ordinal levels , is : 
ln (p/ (1 - p ) )  
where p is the probability o f  choosing a certain alternative or falling 
into a certain group , ln indicates that it is the logarithm of the odds 
ratio which is actually estimated , the betas are parameters , the Xs are 
independent variables , and the U is the error term. After estimating 
the parameters , one may compute the estimated probabilities for various 
. 2 8  levels o f  the independent variables. The estimates will be reported
in probability form in this paper,  and· the lo git coefficients , which , 
unlike regression coefficients , have no simple interpretation , will be 
relegated to an appendix. Since all but one of the Republicans fell 
into the liberal or radical groups , they will be excluded from the 
analysis. 
The logit technique enables us to ask some interes ting kinds 
of questions about the behavior of the sixty-seven Democratic and 
Greenbacker House members who were recorded on enough roll calls to 
1 4  
place them i n  one o f  the four groups . To what degree did their votes 
in April represent the feelings of their constituents in the August 
1882 referendum? How did the party balance in the legislators' counties 
affect the representatives' votes on equalization? Were those from 
overwhelmingly Democratic areas more or less likely to favor it? And how 
much influence did different characteristics of their counties' socio-
economic makeup have on the legislators' actions? Were legislators 
from relatively heavily black counties more or less likely to take a 
liberal or radical position than those from virtually all-white counties? 
How did the variables interact with each other? 
In answering these questions , I have the time and space to 
present only a few o f  the calculations based on a small propor tion o f  the 
possible equations which could have been tried . Table 3 contains logit 
estimates of the probability that a Democratic or Greenbacker legislator 
would fall into each o f  the three indicated groups if his county had 
t d t . . h 1880 'd 
. 1 1 . 2 9  vo e a cer ain way in t e pres1 entia e ection . For instance , 
about 12 percent o f  the legislators from a hypo thetical county where 
56 . 5  percent of the voters backed the Democrats , 8.5 percent the Green-
backers , 34 . 8  percent the GOP , and 0 . 2  percent abstained were likely to 
be radicals or liberals , about 71 percent probably supported only 
30McElroy-Owens , and one in six opposed all change . 
The modal category in all but the last row is the "regular" 
column -- most Demo crats followed their leader s .  Legislators from 
heavily Democratic counties (who appear in the first four rows) , where 
racism was p resumably more prevalent than elsewhere , were dispropor-
tionately likely to be Bourbons , while those who came from counties 
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where only a third of the electorate was solid for the party o f  the 
Confederacy were more likely to be liberals or radicals than Bourbons . 
Variations in support for the Greenback presidential candidate in 1880 
had a very small effect on the likelihood that the county would produce 
a Bourbon , but a decline in the proportion of votes the Greenbackers 
received was associated with a rise in the proportion of legislators 
in the leftward groups . 
The table's most fascinating relationship is between Republican 
strength and Democratic legislative behavior .  Increases in the Republican 
presidential vote were correlated with declines in both Bourbonism and 
liberalism (compare , for instance , rows one and two , or s ix and eight ) .  
Apparently a relatively strong GOP corralled the Democrats into party 
regularity; whereas , a weak one left them free to follow their personal 
or constituency predilections instead of staying with the herd . Although 
one shouldn't stress these conclusions too much , since they are based 
on coefficients with rather large standard errors and equations which 
misclassify too many legislators , it would be interesting to see 
whether the same pattern of party loyalty and opposition strength held 
in other states and for other issues . 
[Table 3 about here] 
As Table 4 shows , the legislators appear to have reflected 
constituency sentiment fairly closely . Counties which recorded a high 
level o f  opposition to the equalization proposal in the August referendum 
tended to produce a great many fewer racial liberals in the legislature 
than those in which opposition was muted in August . Those who came 
from counties where sentiment both for and against equalization was 
16 
high in Augus t  overwhelmingly supported the McElroy-Owens compromise 
bill . Perhaps most striking are the last two rows . Representatives 
of areas where neither supporters or opponents of equalization polled 
a large vote were more likely to be liberals or radicals than those 
from counties with any other mix of sentiments , while those from 
counties where support was tepid and opposition strong were markedly 
more likely to be Bourbons . 31 Perhaps where their constituents lacked
deep feelings on the issue , legi�ators could avoid the posturing of 
the Democratic high command and vote for the outcome which the Ellis 
case had made inevitable . Those from unreconstructed counties had 
little choice but to try symbolically to save the o ld regime . 
[Table 4 about here] 
The three most important demographic correlates of support 
for the liberal and radical positions, shown in Table S, were the urban 
and Negro percentages of each county's population , and the value o f  
white property per white male adult (a proxy for wealth per white 
family ) .
32 Urban legislators were more cosmopolitan and perhaps less
racially sensitive than their counterparts from the hills and hollows . 
Such Democratic urban newspapers as the Louisville Courier-Journal and 
Pos t ,  the Paducah Daily News , and the official state Democratic organ , 
the Frankfort Yeoman , were staunch supporters of equalization , at least 
after the Ellis decision . 33 City leaders must have realized also that
their bailiwicks were prime targets for equalization suits if the 
legislature delayed , for the eleven urban areas contained about a third 
of the state's Negro children , and lawyers for the blacks would probably 
have sought to end discrimination first where equality would have 
benefited the greatest number . 34 
[Table 5 about here] 
Other things being equal , Democratic legislators from 
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relatively heavily Negro counties were about 2 2  percent less likely to 
favor immediate equalization than those from counties which contained 
few blacks . The repeatedly documented positive relation o f  white 
racial attitudes with the threat posed by large proportions of Negros 
sufficiently accounts for this finding . 35
Furthermore , white wealth p er white male adult correlated 
positively with support for instant merging of the school funds .  
Apparently poor rural Democratic counties were hotbeds o f  racism , 
although poor rural Republican counties sent to the legislature 
representatives who stalwartly supported black equality . It is 
impossible to resolve this contradiction with the data at hand , but 
the question deserves further study . None of the other variables had 
large effects on the Democratic legislators' propensity to favor equali-
zation without a referendum, and the small change produced by the black 
spending variable was no t in the expected direction . 
If the results of the analysis of legislature's actions are 
perhaps somewhat clouded by the ability of such a body to compromise ,  
the referendum called b y  the McElroy-Owens A c t  presented the voters with 
a clearer alternative whether to merge the funds and raise the white 
tax rate to keep the white expenditure per child at approximately the 
current rate , or refuse any change .  As Table 6 ,  which is based on 
18 
ordinary leas t-squares (or OLS) multiple regressions o f  the percentage 
of adult males choosing each alternative , indicates , most Republicans 
and Greenbackers voted as their legislators had , and the Democrats 
split , a maj ority of their 1879 and 1880 partisans opposing the reform , 
while a maj ority of those who voted for the Democratic candidate for 
Clerk o f  the Courts of Appeals supported the measure . 
[Table 6 about here] 
Yet since Kentucky , unlike most o ther Southern states , had 
several large cities , the equations which form the basis of Table 6 may 
give misleading results . 36 Population disparities between counties
are taken into account in Table 7 ,  which is based on the technique o f  
generalized leas t-squares ( o r  GLS) . The results are similar to those 
in Table 6 ,  but indicate that much larger percentages of the Republicans 
supported , and considerably higher proportions of the Democrats and 
Greenbackers opposed equalization than Table 6 had implied . In fac t , 
the row showing how the 1880 Greenbackers voted in 1882 contains two 
logically inadmissable estimates , as does the row following it . 
Such estimates , which are fairly common in this type o f  
analysis , can b e  dealt with b y  rees timating the equations and assuming , 
say ,  that the Greenbackers all voted against  equalization and that the 
1880 abs tainers all abstained in 1 882 , or by ignoring the logical 
discrepancies and merely stating that the results mean that nearly all 
Greenbackers opposed the change and few 1880 abs tainers voted . But 
there is a third alternative . Since the problem arises because one is 
using an unconstrained linear model , one might employ a nonlinear model , 
1 9  
such a s  logi t ,  which allows n o  estimates to fall outside the 0-100 
percent logical bounds . 37
[Table 7 about here] 
The results presented in Table 8 ,  which is based on a logit 
model , are much more esthetically and substantively satisfying than 
those in Table 7 .  There are no more logically impossible estimates , 
and the 1882 behavior of those who did not vote in 1880 is not so 
unrealistically extreme . Since 1880 is the temporally closest election 
to the 1 882 referendum which witnessed a high turnout and a straight 
party fight -- some Democrats and many Greenbackers appear to have 
j o ined the 1882 Jacob movement ,  while the state ' s  only Republican 
Congressman and several o ther state GOP leaders pointedly refused to 
endorse the Union Democrat it is the best measure of how the masses 
f . d 38 o partisans vote . The Republicans , white and black, voted six to
one for (segregated) racial equality , the Democrats two to one against ,  
k h . � and the Greenbac ers eig teen to one against .  Democratic overtures
to .the blacks were a bit more than rhetoric , but not much; whereas the 
Republicans , while refusing to press for integration , which would have 
been suicidal , as well as completely ineffective , in the state at that 
time , overwhelmingly supported the largest practicable step toward black 
equality . 
[Table 8 about here] 
The final table presents logit coefficients masquerading as 
regression coefficients , partly to reduce the table ' s  complexity and 
partly to demons trate another guise of the malleable technique . The 
20 
numbers in the table hold only for the roughly linear portions of the 
logarithmic relationships . In this table , I have included both politi-
cal and socioeconomic variables in an at tempt to separate out the 
effects of political philosophy and behavior from those of demographic 
traits . The figures show the 1880 Democrats and Greenbackers in a 
light rather more favorable to modern tastes , but only underline the 
exceptionally liberal behavior of the party of Abraham Lincoln and John 
Marshall Harlan . As in the legislative analysis , a rise in the percent-
age of Negroes in a county provided a s ignificant push toward Bourbonism. 
Since newspaper reports of the election indicate that blacks over-
whelmingly backed equalization , whites in the heavily black counties 
must have almost unanimously opposed it . Other things being equal , 
urbanites were barely more likely than their country cousins to vote 
"yes" in the election,  but markedly less likely to vote "no . "  Roman 
Catholics , who often sent their children to parochial schools in 
Kentucky at this time , appear to have been a bit less favorable to a 
tax increase for the p ublic schools than Protestants . None of the o ther 
variables had very large impacts on the referendum voting, 
[Table 9 about here] 
In his Jefferson lectures on racial equality in America , John 
Hope Franklin s tated that " . the position of freedmen in the postwar 
South was scarcely bet ter than that of free blacks in the antebellum 
period, . The Reconstruction years were marked by halfhearted , 
lighthearted , inconclusive steps taken by the state and federal 
governments to introduce a semblance of racial equality in America . 
The feeble effort was an abj ect failure . , . , There were few voices 
2 1  
raised anywhere against the far-reaching [post-Recons truction] program 
looking to the degradation and humiliation of blacks everywhere.  , , , 
the emancipation of the slaves had no discernible effect on the movement 
for racial equality . "  In a similarly pessimis tic vein , another prominent 
Afro-American historian , the former editor of the Journal of Negro 
His tory, W. Augustus Low , recently asserted that "As in the Deep South , 
public education for the Negro in Kentucky was virtually nonexistent 
until after the turn of the century . 11
40 
The analysis presented in this paper , as well as the more 
extensive efforts of other scholars , belies the s tatement s  of Franklin 
and Low .
41 
Kentucky blacks used the political power granted by the
Fifteenth Amendment and the legal weapons preserved in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to guarantee their children an equal share in educational 
spending in Kentucky , at leas t at the state level . 42 If their schools
were poor , they were not ,  after 1882 , appreciably worse than those for 
whites in the Bluegrass stat e .  
I n  their struggle to eliminate the grosser farms of  racial 
inequality, moreover , the blacks succeeded only with the assis tance of 
sympathetic whites . E .  W. Bagby skillfully argued the Ellis case , 
obtaining a favorable result from two Southern white Republican federal 
j udges , John Baxter of North Carolina and Tennessee and John W. Barr 
43 of Kentucky . James Breathitt , a native white Kentucky Republican , 
was the chief proponent of equalization in the legislatur e .  The great 
mass of Republican voters staunchly backed the merging of funds in 
the referendum . In fact , Southern white Republican support of measures 
upholding black equality and repelling attempts to increase discrimi-
2 2  
nation , while by n o  means universal , was common enough t o  suggest the 
propriety of their inclusion on C .  Vann Woodward's list of the forces 
res training the South's "capitulation to extreme racism" in the late 
. 
h 44nineteent century . 
A substantially smaller number of Southern Democrats , 
especially those from affluent urban areas and from counties which had 
few blacks , also stood up for equalization . Counties with strong 
Republican movement s  tended to produce "regular" Democrats , while 
counties in which the GOP was weak sent to the legislature dispropor-
tionate numbers of both liberals and reactionaries . But the vast bulk 
of that party's legislators in 1 882 opposed equal spending until the 
Ellis case made it a fait accompli , and some continued to protest 
agains t the inevitable even then . Furthermore , in the August referendum , 
about two-thirds of the Democrats who voted seem to have deserved the 
"Bourbon" label attached to them by scornful Republicans . 
Finally , it should be noted that these substantive conclusions 
could be reached only because of the availability of sophisticated 
quantitative techniques , specifically logit analysis . The usefulness 
of that technique not only in disentangling the correlates of legislative 
behavior , but also in allowing logically satisfactory estimates of 
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1 3 .  In the 1 8 7 4  case o f  Marshall v .  Donovan , 7 3  Ky . 681 , the Kentucky 
Court o f  Appeals ruled that education was not a "privilege or 
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immunity" inuring t o  blacks a s  citizens o f  the U . S . , that there­
fore discrimination in taxing and spending for education was no t 
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment , and that whatever guarantees 
of Negro rights to the Fourteenth Amendment contained could be put 
into effect only by the legislature,  not the courts . Since one 
of Marshall's lawyers was a prominent leader of the s tate's 
Republican party , James Speed , and since the challenge to racial 
discriminat ion was somewhat extraneous (Marshall was whit e ) , it is 
possible that Marshall ,  too , was a test case . If it was , it was 
certainly a poor choice , s ince the court could easily have dismissed 
Marshall's equal pro tection argument , since he was not black . 
And because Marshall was no t pursued until seven years had elapsed 
it is difficult to believe that it was part of a concerted strategy 
or had anything to do with Ellis , as Howard , "Struggle for Equal 
Education , " 320-322 ,  implies . In any event , the Marshall precedent 
seemed to preclude a successful challenge to the 1874 law in the 
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White . On Breathitt , see William Elsey Connelley and E .  Merton 
Coulter , History of Kentucky (Chicago and New York : The American 
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7 ,  1881 , March 2 4 ,  1882 . For the introduction and provisions o f  his 
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Dec . 16 , 1382 , in which that Democratic paper stated that "the 
petty thieves of the S tate are nearly all [N]egroes . II 
15 . On this Mulligan amendment , see Richmond Kentucky Register , Feb . 10 , 
1882; Louisville Commercial , Feb . 8 ,  9 ,  1882 . The Feb . 8 Commercial 
outlined the argument that Fayette County would gain funds from 
equalization . The wealth and educational statistics here and 
throughout this paper are taken from the relevant printed reports 
of the state auditor and superintendent of public instruction . 
"Judge" Mulligan , who was Irish,  was a prominent anti-Mormon , a 
pos ition usually associated with "pietis tic" Protestants , rather 
than "liturgical" Catholics . See Louisville Commercial , Feb . 10 , 
1882 . 
16 . See Louisville Commercial , March 2 ,  17 , 1882; Louisville Courier­
Journal , March 2 9 ,  April 1, 1882; Kentucky State Journal (1881-
82)'  7 9 8 .  
17 . Louisville Commercial , April 12 , 13 , 1882 . Similarly , though no t 
so vituperatively , see Louisville Bulletin (Negro ) and Indianapolis 
Journal , quoted in ibid . , April 15 , 1882; Cleveland Leader (black) , 
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ment . See the April 12 , 1882 issue . 
18 . Louisville Commercial , April 11, 12 , 1882 . The fees of the o ffice 
reportedly amounted to $80 , 000-$100 , 000 per year , and the clerk 
himself apparently cleared about $25 , 000 , which was five times 
as high as the governor's salary . 
19 . Louisville Commercial , April 11, 1882 . Bagby had no t asked for any 
specific remedy . See Paducah Daily News , Feb . 2 9 ,  1882 . Though 
the case was apparently decided on April 4, the news seems to have 
taken a week to travel from Paducah to Louisville , and one day 
longer to get to Frankfor t . U . S .  v. Buntin , 10 Fed . Rep . 730 . 
The quotations in the Buntin and Ellis cases were taken from 
Louisville Commercial , April 11 , 1882 . 
20 . For Bagby's threats , see Louisville Commercial , April 11, 18 , 1882 . 
For the Paducah mass meeting , see Louisville Commercial , April 2 0 ,  
1882 . For Democratic fears of the effect of Ellis , see Louisville 
Courier-Journal , April 14 , 1882 . "It may be well enough , "  Bagby 
contended in the April 18 Commercial , which was widely read by 
Democrats in the legislature , "to let the Democratic party in 
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Kentucky know , right here,  that the petty , vexing tyranny of such 
legislation will no t be longer tolerated in this State . If the 
school fund for the education of the common school children of the 
State is no t equalized by this Legislature , then the proper officers 
whose duty it is to collect and distribute the fund will be forced , 
by legal process , to distribute it , pro rat a ,  among all the pupil 
children of the Commonwealth . There will be a meeting of leading 
colored citizens in this city [Paducah] within a few days , who will 
take into consideration the measures necessary to secure this resul t . "
21 . For reports of the caucus , see Louisville Courier-Journal, April 
2 1 , 1882 . For the authorship o f  the bill and HcElroy ' s  position as 
Owens ' s  l ieutenant , see ibid . , June 9 ,  1 882 and Louisville Pos t , 
May 4 ,  1882 . 
22 . Kentucky House Journal (1881-82 ) ,  1578-1582 . 
2 3 .  Kentucky Senate Journal (1881-82 ) ,  1170-117 6 .  
24 . The party designations of the legislators were given in Louisville 
Commercial , Nov . 7 ,  1881 . 
2 5 .  There are hints that the structure o f  attitudes o n  the issues 
related to equalization was more complext than treated here . 
I t  is clear that the votes do not fall into a simple unidimensional 
Guttman scale , since the "radicals "  j oined the "Bourbons" in voting 
against McElroy-Owens . It appears that the votes tapped at leas t 
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three dimensions : attitudes toward parties , toward tax increases , 
and toward equalizat ion . Thus , some quite racist Democrats no 
doubt favored HcElroy-Owens only because the leadership convinced 
them that the measure was necessary for the party ' s  welfare , that 
since the court was going to order equalization anyway , the 
Democracy might as well take credit for it.  And o ther Democrats 
acted as if they had a preferred level ("bliss point" ) o f  tax 
increases . Whereas , Breathitt and the Republicans felt it  a 
propitious time for hiking taxes by 50 percent , some Democrats 
would stand for a 10 percen t ,  but not a 15 percent increase . 
Unfortunately , there were too few roll calls to allow us to 
distinguish these attitudes mathematically through some multi­
dimensional scaling or cohesion procedure , and the compromise 
McElroy-Owens bill conflated several dimensions precisely as 
it was meant to do. Anytime there is competent leadership in a 
legislature , there will be logrolling , which will result in the 
passage of legislation , but impede an analyst who mechanically 
applies scaling algorithms without really knowing how the key 
legislators have shaped the agenda . The crucial roles played by 
a few leaders who usually dominate the largely incompetent masses 
of s tate legislators , the high probability that the crafty logrolls 
they shape will often foul up fancy mathematical procedures , and 
the fact that most roll calls in state legislatures , at least in 
the nineteenth century,  concerned utterly trivial questions all 
serve to undercut the unthinking use o f  sophisticated procedures 
and render s imple commonsensical ones usually superior for scaling 
the attitudes of legislators . 
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2 6 .  It  i s  unclear what interest the Greenbackers had in "Bourbon" 
policies , but that party's greatest s trength was in the extreme 
western end of the state , which had been the chief hotbed of 
Confederate sentiment during the War . All four Greenbacker legis­
lators came from this area .  Perhaps racist sentiments were 
stronger there,  although the proportion of Negroes in that section 
was lower than in the bluegrass area . Or perhaps western 
Kentucky had gone with the Confederacy because it had had fewer 
economic ties with the north and more with the south than o ther 
areas in the state , and residual antipathy to the party of the 
Union pushed them into Bourbonism. For the division in wartime 
sentiments,  see Ross A. Webb , "Kentucky : 'Pariah Among the Elect , "' 
in Richard O .  Curry , ed . ,  Radicalism, Racism, and Party Realign­
ment , 109 . 
27. See Yvonne M .  M. Bishop , Stephen E .  Feinberg , and Paul W. Holland , 
Dis crete Multivariate Analysis : Theory and Practice (Cambridge , 
Mass . :  MIT Press , 1975 ) , and David K .  Hildebrand , James D .  Laing , 
and Howard Rosenthal , Prediction Analysis of Cross Classifications
(New York : John Wiley and Sons , 1 977) . 
2 8 .  T o  compute the probability of voting "yes " for a legislator from 
an average county in an either/or vo te with abstainers excluded , 
for example , the equation becomes: 
p (yes) = exp (S'X) / (l+exp (S'X) ) ,
where exp is the exponential function , S' a transposed vector of 
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parameters (previously estimated by computer) ,  and X a vector of 
the means of the independent variables . Formulas for a larger 
number of alternatives and different combinations of variables are 
messier , but can be evaluated with a hand calculator which has 
slide-rule functions . 
29. Since only four Democrats fell into the radical category , I have 
consolidated it with the liberal category here to decrease the
errors in estimation . 
30 . These particular percentages were chosen because they were one 
standard deviation above the mean (except for the abstainers ) .  
The means of the party percentages for the counties from which 
the legislators came are given in the fifth row of the table . 
I have computed the probabilities for levels of the independent 
variables at their means and ± one standard deviation in Tables 
4 and 5 also . 
31 . The northwest-southeast trend of the table would be much more 
pronounced , of course , if I could have included legislative 
Republicans . Since only one Republican fell into the regular 
or Bourbon categories , however ,  those cell entries were nearly 
empty ,  and the computer algorithm would not converge to give a 
solution to the equation which included legislators from that party . 
32 . The groupings have been collapsed into two categories here in 
order to improve the reliability of the logit coefficients . 
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33 . Courier-Journal editor Henry Wat terson had been courting the 
black vote in Kentucky and the nation for years , and fervently 
wished to dispel the Southern Democrats' reactionary social image 
at a time when the "newer departure" Democracy seemed to be 
attracting Negro support .  On the "newer departure , "  see Lawrence 
Grossman , The Democratic Party and the Negro : Northern and 
National Politics, 1 868-92 (Urbana , Ill. : University of Illinois 
Press , 1976) . ·For editorials supporting equalization , see 
Louisville Courier-Journal , Jan . 12 , Feb . 17 , April 12 , July 2 8 ,  
Aug . 2 ,  1882; Louisville Post , Aug . 5 ,  1882; Paducah Daily News , 
June 20 , 22 ,  1882; Richmond Kentucky Weekly Regis ter , July 2 8 ,  
1882; Frankfort Daily Yeoman , April 1 9 ,  July 2 9 ,  1882 . Thirty­
nine percent of the black children in the state in 1 882 lived in 
the eleven counties containing towns of over 4000 population . 
34 .  There were more good lawyers in urban than rural areas , and the 
comparative anonymity of the each citizen in a large town or 
city would allow counsel who aspired to political power to escape 
the lasting pariahdom they might have courted by standing up for 
black rights in a hamlet where everyone knows everyone else and 
nobody every forgets . For a threat by Louisville black leader 
Dr . Fitzbutler to file a suit to force that city to equalize its 
schools , see Louisville Commercial , June 14, 1 882 . 
35 . See , e . g . , Hubert M. Blalock , Toward a Theory of Minority Group 
Relations (New York : G. P .  Putnam's Sons , 1970) . 
3 6 .  See Appendix A for a further discussion o f  GLS . 
37 . See Appendix B for further discussion of the logit model . 
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38 . Though the Democratic Louisville Post endorsed the 1882 Independent 
campaign , both my OLS and• GLS estimates show no voters who 
supported Winfield Scott Hancock in 1 880 backing Jacob in 1 882 . 
The estimates do show, however , that from 7 to 1 9  percent o f  the 
Garfield supporters backed the Democratic candidate for Appeals 
Court Clerk , while about 95 percent of those who voted the Greenback 
ticket for James B .  Weaver and turned out in 1882 seem to have 
favored Jacob . For the Post endorsemen t ,  see the issue of June 7 ,  
1882 . For the GOP split , see Louisville Commercial , June 1 9 ,  
July 2 5 ,  1882 . Many Negroes and o ther Republicans could no t 
forget Jacob's leadership o f  the racist "Conservative Unionist" 
party in 1867-68 . See Webb , "'Pariah Among the Elect ,  111 117 , 120 , 
1 2 3 .  
39 . Some blacks opposed the equalization measure because it mandated 
segregated school s ,  but numerous black gatherings throughout the 
state endorsed i t .  See Louisville Commercial May 1 7 ,  22 , 2 9 ,  June 
.1 , 5 ,  1 0 ,  15 , 1882; Richmond Kentucky Weekly Register , June 9 ,  1882 . 
40 . Franklin , Racial Equality in America (Chicago : University o f  
Chicago Press , 1976) , 60-62 , 72; Low, "The Freedman's Bureau in 
the Border States , "  in Curry , Radicalism, Racism , and Party Re­
alignmen t ,  2 5 3 .  
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41 . Although a tremendous number of examples could be cited , one might 
s tart with Howard N .  Rabinowitz ,  Race Relat ions in the Urban South , 
1865-1890 (New York : Oxford University Press , 1978) . 
42 . Separate taxation and expenditure systems persisted in scat tered 
areas until 1936 , but there was apparently much less discrimination 
against the vas t maj ority of Negro children in Kentucky than against 
those in s tates further South . See Leonard Ephraim Meece , Negro 
Education in Kentucky :  A Comparative Study of White and Negro 
Education on the Elementary and Secondary School Levels (Lexington , 
Ky . : University of Kentucky Press , 1938 ) , 21-22 , 6 0 ,  105 , 118-1 9 .  
4 3 .  On Barr and Baxter , see Harold Chase e t  al . ,  Biographical Dictionary 
of the Federal Judiciary (Detroit : Gale Research Co . ,  1 9 7 6 ) , 15 , 1 7 . 
44 . C .  Vann Woodward ' s  list in The Strange Career of Jim Crow , 3d revised 
ed. (New York : Oxford University Pres s ,  1974) , 44-64 contains 
neither blacks nor white Southern Republicans . 
45 . Logit and probit can also be used in cases where the dependent 
variable is nominal . For example , it could be employed to determine 
the correlates o f  moving or staying in analyses of social or 
geographic mobility . 
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TABLE 1 
PARTY AND GROUPINGS ON EQUALIZATION BILLS 
Party 
Group Democrat Republican Greenback 
Bourbons 8 0 2 
Regulars 37 1 1 
Liberals 15 15 0 
Radicals 4 4 0 
Abs t ained or 
Insufficient votes 10 2 1 
Chi-Square 
= 
36 . 58 (P < . 001) 
Group on 
TABLE 2 
GROUPINGS ON EQUALIZATION &�D VOTES ON 
WHIPPING POST BILL (Democrats Only) 
Whipping Post Bill 
Equaliza tion For Against 
Bourbons 7 0 
Regulars 2 3  5 
Liberals 4 10 
Radicals 1 3 
Abstain 3 4 
Chi-Square 
= 










LOGIT ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNTY VOTES 
IN 1880 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION k�D LEGISLATIVE GROUPINGS 
ON EQUALIZATION IN 1882 LEGISLATURE 
Predicted Percentage of 
County Vo te in 1880 Election Legislators in Group 
Dem. Grbk . Repub . Abstain Rad . -Lib . Reg .  Bourbon 
. 565 . 085 . 348 . 00 2  . 12 2  . 712 . 166 
. 565 . 085 . 17 2  . 17 8  . 18 7  . 57 8  . 235 
. 565 -0- . 348 . 08 7  . 154 . 682 . 164 
. 565 -0- . 17 2  . 263 . 23 1  . 543 . 226 
. 444 . 031 . 260 . 265 . 270 . 5 83 . 14 7  
. 323 . 085 . 348 . 244 . 288 . 617 . 095 
. 323 -0- . 348 . 329 . 34 7  . 565 . 0 88 
. 323 . 085 . 17 2  . 420 . 41 1  . 466 . 12 3  
. 32 3  -0- . 17 2  . 505 . 47 8  . 410 . 112 
Actual percent in each group . 284 . 567  . 149 
Percent of legislators correctly placed in groups . 62 7  
TABLE 4 
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COUNTY VOTES 
IN AUGUST ,  1882 REFERENDUM ON EQUALIZATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
GROUPINGS ON EQUALIZATION IN 1882 
Vo te in Referendum Predicted Percent of Legislature 
For Against Abstain Rad . Lib . Reg .  Bourbon 
. 4 30 . 131 . 439 . 02 1  . 348 . 51 4  . 117  
. 430 . 377 . 193 . 026 . 037  . 844 . 09 3  
. 315 . 25 4  . 431 . 064 . 175 . 614 . 147 
. 200 . 131 . 669 . 150 . 495 . 269 . 086 
. 200 . 37 7  . 42 3  . 052 . 0 74 . 619 . 255 
Percent of legislators correctly placed in groups . 62 1  
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TABLE 5 
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIOECONOMIC 
VARIABLES AND LEGISLATIVE GROUPINGS ON EQUALIZATIONl 
Socioeconomic Indicators 2 
%Negro %Roman %Urban %Undem Bspend Wt ax Wval 
. 15 2  . 089 . 161 - . 179 1 . 245 . 517  1322 . 44 
. 035 1 . 850 
. 269 1 . 850 
. 035 . 640 
. 269  . 640 
. 035 . 279  
. 035 -0-
. 269 . 279  
. 269  -0-
. 45 7  2 2 12 . 56 
. 457  432 . 32 
-0- 2212 . 56 
-0- 432 . 32 
. 035 . 457  
. 269  . 457  
. 269  -0-
. 035 -0-
. 035 2 2 12 . 56 
. 035 432 . 32 
. 269  2 2 12 . 56 
. 269  432 . 32 





. 22 8  
. 333 
. 106 
. 42 7  
. 179  
. 29 9  
. 32 1  









. 0 79 
. 549 
. 19 8  
. 263 
. 06 7  
1 .  
NOTES to TABLE 5 
%NEGRO is the percentage of registered voters in 1882 who were 
Negroes . Since registrars were paid to regis ter voters , this 
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was virtually the same as the percentage of adult males who were 
Negroes . 
%ROMAN is the percentage of total church property owned by the 
Roman Catholic Church . No church membership figures exist for 
this period to my knowledge . 
%URBAN is the percentage in towns and cities over 4 , 000 , taken 
from the 1880 U .  S. Census of population . 
%UNDEM is an estimate of the percentage of former Unionists (as 
opposed to Confederates) who normally voted Democratic . I t  was 
formed by subtracting the Republican vote in the 1879 Governor ' s  
race from the percentage for the independent ( former Unionist)  
Jacob in the 1882  Court of Appeals race .  
BSPEND is  the increase in spending for black schools in each 
county from 1882 to 1883 divided by the number of white male adults . 
WTAX is the increase in white property taxes from 1882 to 1883
divided by the number of white male adults . 
WVAL is the value of white property in 1882 divided by the number 
of white male adults . All variables except the %URBAN and %UNDEM 
come from the report of the s tate auditor for 188 3 .  
2 .  T o  decrease the complexity o f  the table,  blanks have been left in-
s tead of inserting the means of the variables being held constant 
in each row . 
TABLE 6 
UNWEIGHTED OLS ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
VOTES IN 187 9 GUBERNATORIAL , 1880 PRESIDENTIAL , AND 
1882 COURT OF APPEALS RACES AND VOTES IN 1882 REFERENDUM 
1879 Governor For 
Dem. 36 
Repub . 53 
Abs tain 12 
1880 President For 
Dem. 34 
Repub . 52 
Gr bk.  17  
Abs tain 3 
1882 Appeals Court For 
Dem. 53 
Ind . 48 




1 6  
2 9  













2 3  
3 1  
5 9  
Abs tain 
28 








GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN 
VOTES IN 1879 GOVERNOR' S ,  1880 PRESIDENTIAL , AND 1882 APPEALS 
COURT RACES AND VOTES IN 1882 EQUALIZATION REFERENDUM! 
1882 Referendum 
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1879 Governor For Agains t Abstain 
Dem. 36 5 1  
Repub . 64 15 
Abstain 11 13 
1882 Referendum 
1880 President For Against 
Dem. 31 51 
Repub . 68 4 
Gr bk . 30 117 
Abstain - 8 4 
1882 Referendum 
1882 Appeals Court For Against 
Dem. 55 37 
Ind . 41 2 3  
Abstain 10 22 
1 .  The estimating equations were o f  the following form: 













where ./N is the square root of the adult male population in 
each county . 
TABLE 8 
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
1880 PRESIDENTIAL RACE AND 1882 REFERENDUM 
1882 Referendum 
1880 President For Against 
Dem. 25 51 
Repub . 60 10 
Grbk. 5 91 






7 9  
TABLE 9 
LOGIT ESTIMATES OF CHANGE IN VOTES IN REFERENDUM FOR
INCREASES IN POLITICAL AND SOCIOECONOMIC VARIABLES OF ONE PERCENTl 
Change in voting in referendum 
Independent 
Variable For Against Abs tain 
%Dem. , 1880 President . 176  - . 008 - . 168 
%Rep . ,  1880 President . 59 8  - . 406 - . 19 2  
%Grbk . ,  1880 President . 26 4  - . 0 28 - . 236 
%Negro - . 173  • 257 - . 084 
%Urban . 015 - . 19 4  . 180 
%Roman - . 09 3  - . 006 . 09 9  
Wval (in $1000 ' s )  . 003 . 010 - . 0 13 
Wt ax . 00 3  . 019 - . 016  
Bspend - . 008 . 04 7  - . 039 
Undem - . 07 8  - . 04 7  . 031 
1 .  The relationships hold only between ± one standard deviation 
from the mean of the independent variables , and can be interpreted 
as giving the change in the dependent variables for a 1% change 
in the relevant independent variable , holding all other 
independent variables cons tan t .  
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APPENDIX A 
The variance o f  the error term in a regression based on data 
aggregated over geographical uni ts which differ widely in population is 
not constant , yet OLS assumes that variance is constan t .  We can 
partially remedy the s ituation , however , if we first  recognize why 
the error variance is no t constan t .  
Suppose one is interested i n  how individuals vo te . Then for 
each individual , we can es timate a probability that he will vo te , say , 
Democratic , given certain traits , by an equation such as : 
(1)  
where the i subscript refers to counties , the j subscrip t to individuals , 
the Y is a vector of voter choices , the X a matrix of traits or 
independent variables , and the U a vector of error terms with expected 
value zero . 
The variance of the error term is 
(2)  
which is assumed in regression to be constant . 
Unfortunately , we observe data only on the county , no t the 
individual level , so that equation (1)  becomes : 
(3)  
Ni 
I y . . /N . 
i=l lJ l 
N ,  
l S ' I X . .  /N . 
i= l lJ l 
N ,  
l 
+ I u . . /N . 
i =l lJ l 
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where the N . s  refer t o  the number o f  people in county i ,  and the 
l 
summations are across all individuals in each county . 
(4)  
The variance of the error term here is : 
( Ni 2 Ni Ni 2 
I u L Y . . I x . .  
i=l ij ) = (i=l lJ - s i=l lJ ) E 
N .  E N . Ni. l l 
Since the errors are assumed to be independent across all 
individuals , the expectation for each county of the square of the 
errors is equal to the sum of the expectation of the errors squared , or 
(5)  
� �i u . · j2 
i=l lJ E 
Ni 
And since the N i in the denominator is a constan t ,  its expected value
is j ust itself , so we have 
(6)  
( �\ . 
·
)2 
i=l lJ E ---
N .  . 
l 
which differs from (2) by the factor of l/Ni . 
To correct for this divergence , we multiply the whole 
equation through by IN-:- , or the square root of the population in each 
l 
county , giving us : 
( 7 )  
which reduces to 
Ni � Ni 
l Y . .  l x . .  l u . .  
i=l lJ ·-1 lJ i=l lJ (8)  --- = S '2:'::__ + 
IN-:- IN-:- � 
l l l 
And the error variance is 
( 9 )  
N 1. N .  N .  





By the same arguments as stated earlier , we can take the sums 
and constants outside the expectations , giving us 
(10) 
Ni ( ( 2 )  
l E Y . . - SX . ·) 
i=l lJ lJ 
and the sums on both s ides are equal to N . .  , giving us finally 
lJ 
(11) 
All the Nis cancel , and we see that if we es timate the parameters
by first multiplying both the independent and dependent variables through 
by � for each county, we have equation (1) . 
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APPENDIX B 
We can obtain estimates from aggregated data which fall out­
side the 0-100 percent logical boundaries for three reasons . Often , we 
have a fairly small sample o f  observations , and by chance the slope o f  
the regression line gives u s  unreasonable estimates . If we had a very 
large sample , the slope would be different , and the estimates o f ,  say , 
the probability of Greenbackers voting "no" in the referendum would be 
admissable . Usually , such estimates are not very far outside the 
bounds , and it is sufficient to set them at the logical limits and 
recalculate the equations accordingly . But it may be that the logical 
complications arise because we have tried to extrapolate too far 
beyond our data points or that we have estimated the wrong model . 1 
In such cases , logit may be useful . 
Consider the problem in estimating what proportion of Green­
backers voted against equalization . The maximum percentage of the 
adult males who voted in the 1880 presidential race was 31 . 7  percen t .  
The highest proportion o f  votes against equalization i n  1882 was 6 2 . 4  
percent . As Figure 1 shows , all the data points are concentrated in 
the rather small shaded rectangle in the lower left-hand corner of the 
graph . But in trying to estimate what percentage of the Greenbackers 
voted against equalization , we are , in effect , predicting how a county 
which was composed only of members of that party (i . e . , which was 100 
percent Greenback) would vo te . To do this , we have to project the 
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linear regression line to the point at which it cuts the vertical line 
on the right-hand side of the graph.  Yet  this is far beyond the data , 
which all lies in the shaded box . If our data extended beyond the 
shaded area , it might lie on a different linear regression line , or even 
on a nonlinear curve . The point is that it is dangerous to extrapolate 
so far beyond the available data , and we should not be too surprised to 
get nonsensical results if we do so.  
I t  is also unreasonable to believe that the world will always 
be linear . I f ,  in fac t , the relation between two or more variables is 
no t linear , we may get illogical estimates because we have estimated 
an incorrect model . Besides graphing the bivariate relationships and 
examining them to see whether they fall into obvious nonlinear patterns 
(log-linear , quadratic , etc. ) ,  we might also consider relationships 
which follow the form of the logit . The logit function describes an 
S-shaped curve , as in Figure 2 ,  which has an appealing behavioral 
interpretation . For data in the middle ranges of each variable , the 
logit relationship is approximately linear . For data on the extremes , 
however , the curve tails off quite quickly , and asymp to t ically approaches 
the X axis and the line parallel to the X axis at Y = 100 percen t .  
Substantively , the theory underlying the curve states that a change in 
the independent variable from , say , 40 to 60 percent causes a large 
change in the dependent variable, but a change from 0 to 20 percent or 
from 80 to 100 percent does not .  Once a county is overwhelmingly "X" 
or "not X , "  changes in the value of X make little difference in Y .  I f  
the analyst has reason t o  believe such a behavioral assumption appro­
priate for his dat a ,  he should consider trying to fit a logit model . 
52 
Moreover , the logit model may also provide a better extrapolation from 
a limited set of data , such as that in Figure 1 ,  for it allows a 
relaxation of the very strong linear assump tion . I t  is for this reason 
that I used logit to es timate the relationships in Table 8 .  
FOOTNOTE TO APPENDIX B 
1 .  See J .  Morgan Kousser , "Ecological Regression and the Analysis of 
Past Politics , "  Journal o f  Interdisciplinary History ,  I V  (197 3 ) , 
252-62 . 
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FIGURE 1 :  Bivariate Relationship between Percentage o f  
Greenback , 1 880 , and Percentage Against 
Equalization , 1882 Referendum 
100% 
% Greenback , 1880 
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FIGURE 2 :  An S-shaped Logit Curve 
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APPENDIX C 
y Table C-1 : Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors for Table 3 
x 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
* 
constant (R-L) 3 . 4480 2 . 0629 
constant (Reg . ) 1 .  3355 1 . 9206 
% Dem. (R-L) -5 . 9093 3 . 4749 
% Dem. (Reg . ) -1 . 7626 2 .  9775 
% Gr bk . (R-L) -2 . 9569 7 . 7005 
% Gr bk. (Reg . )  0 . 2 841 6 . 8893 
% Rep . (R-L) - 0 . 4884 4 . 9227 
% Rep . (Reg . )  3 . 1305 4 . 3495 
* 
There are separate coefficients in logit for each alternative considered . 
Here , the first coefficient in each pair is associated with the proba­
bility of falling into the radical or liberal groups (R-L) , the second , 
the regular group (Reg . ) .  The probability of falling into the Bourbon 
group is obtained by subtraction , after the other probabilities are 
calculated . 
Table C-2 : Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors for Table 4 
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Variable Coefficient S tandard Error 
constant 2 . 2 721 1 . 32 9 7  
% For -3 . 2232 2 . 8208  
% Agains t -9 . 5155 3 . 1601 
Table C-3 : Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors for Table 5
* 
5 7  
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
const ant -1 . 3925 1 . 0950 
% Negro -5 . 2 4 70 5 . 0106 
% Roman 1 . 6436 1 . 5291 
% Urban 3 . 9228 1 . 3220 
% Undem -1 . 4978  1 . 9800 
Bspend -0 . 5068 0 . 6022 
Wtax -1 . 2126 1 . 3700 
Wval 0 . 0009 0 . 0009 
* 
For definitions of the variables , please refer to the notes to Table 
5 in the text . 
Table C-4 : Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors for Table 8 
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Table C-5 : Logit Coefficients and Standard Errors for Table 9 
Variable Coefficient S tandard Error 
constant (For) -1 . 4 768 0 . 0406 
constant (Agains t )  -0 . 3995 0 . 0420 
0 . 0711 Variable Coefficient Standard Error % Dem . (F) 0 . 9874 
% Dem. (A) 0 . 4164 0 . 0745 
constant (For) - 2 . 0609 0 . 0196 % Grbk . (F) 1 .  3990 O . ll05 
constant (Against) -2 . 0217 0 . 0204 % Grbk . (A) 0 . 5 244 0 . 1072 
% Rep . (F) 2 . 3163 0 . 0424 
% Dem . (F) 2 . 0996 0 . 0359 
% Rep . (A) -0 . 9055 0 . 0467 
% Dem . (A) 2 . 7642 0 . 0370  Wval ($1000) (F) . 0385 0 . 0077  
% Gr bk. (F) 2 . 4021 0 . 0885 Wval ( $1000) (A) -0 . 2160 0 . 0090 
Wtax (F) 0 . 0335 O . Oll9 
% Grbk . (A) 5 . 2437 0 . 0836 
Wt ax (A) 0 . 1066 0 . 0137 
% Rep . (F) 2 . 7503 0 . 032 8 Bspend (F) 0 . 0810 0 . 0074 
% Rep . (A) 0 . 8724 0 . 0363 Bspend (A) 0 . 2 662 0 . 0076 
Undem . (F) -0 . 3157 0 . 0382 
Undem . (A) 0 . 0822 0 . 0402 
% Negro (F) -0 . 2903 0 . 0534 
% Negro (A) 1 . 2694 0 . 0590 
% Urban (F) -0 . 4123 0 . 0223 
% Urban (A) -1 . 7247  0 . 0245 
% Roman (F) -0 . 5389 0 . 0192 
% Roman (A) - 0 . 2 838 0 . 0182 
